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Abstract
Traditional neuroeconomic theories of decision-making as-
sume that utilities are based on intrinsic values of outcomes
and that those values depend on how salient are outcomes in
relation to the current motivational state. The fact that humans,
and possibly also other animals, are able to plan in view of fu-
ture motivations is not accounted by this view. So far, it is not
clear which are the structures and the computational mecha-
nisms employed by the brain during these processes. In this
article, we present a Bayesian computational model that de-
scribes how the brain considers future motivations and assigns
value to outcomes in relation to this information. We compare
our model of anticipated motivation with a model that imple-
ments the standard perspective in decision-making and assigns
value only based on the animal’s current motivations. The re-
sults of our simulations indicate an advantage of the model
of anticipated motivation in volatile environments. Finally we
connect our computational proposal to animal and human stud-
ies on prospection and foresight abilities and to neurophysio-
logical investigations on their neural underpinnings.
Keywords: prospection, foresight, goal-directed decision-
making, model-based, expected utility, anticipatory motivation
Introduction
In line with expected utility theory (EUT), most economic and
neuroeconomic models view decision-making as aimed at the
maximization of expected utility (von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1944). Many studies have investigated the mechanisms
through which the brain encodes utility values associated with
planning. Recent neuroeconomic and computational models
argue that, in goal-directed behavior, motivation might be the
substrate according to which specific utilities are assigned to
outcomes. It follows that different motivational states may
correspond to different utility functions. With this regard,
Niv et al. (2006) define motivation as the mapping between
outcomes and their utilities, and refer to ”motivational states”
(e.g. hunger or thirst) as indices of such different mappings,
as one in which foods are mapped to high utilities, and an-
other in which liquids have high utilities.
Although this view can explain most cases of utility assign-
ment in goal-directed behavior, it cannot account for some
subtle aspects of human (and possibly also non-human) plan-
ning, which derive from prospection abilities (Buckner and
Carroll, 2007; Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Pezzulo and Castel-
franchi, 2009) and the anticipation of future cognitive, mo-
tivational and emotional processes. Indeed, during decision-
making, not only humans consider how they currently feel or
what they think, but (to some extent) they can also anticipate
how they will feel or what they will think successively, when
the outcome is delivered (but see Gilbert and Wilson, 2007
for a discussion of sources of errors in those predictions).
In this paper we focus on the ability to anticipate one’s own
future motivational states. As recognized by Suddendorf and
Corballis (1997) in their ”mental time travel hypothesis”, a
critical feature of planning is the subjects’ ability to take ac-
tion in the light of future motivational needs, independently
from their current motivational state. For instance, we go to
supermarket even when not hungry, since we anticipate that
we will be hungry successively. In terms of EUT, the utility of
each future outcome may depend on how much we expect to
be motivated when we reach it. The evolutionary advantages
of anticipating motivations could be related to better adaptiv-
ity in complex and dynamic environments.
In this article, we propose a computational theory of how
the goal-directed system assigns utility on the basis of antic-
ipation of future motivations. Indeed, in utility assignment
these sources of information seem to interact with the intrin-
sic values of outcomes, contrary to EUT. Furthermore, we
touch the issue of which brain structures could implement
these mechanisms in human and non-human animals. Our
model extends the Bayesian model of goal-directed decision-
making proposed by Botvinick and collaborators (Botvinick
and An, 2009; Botvinick et al., sub) (the baseline model from
now on). Like many RL models, the baseline model as-
signs utility to outcomes based only on current motivation.
By adding to the baseline model a component for modeling
motivational dynamics (a motivational forward model), we
make it able to consider its future motivational states during
decision-making. Performance of the two models is com-
pared in three illustrative tasks in which consideration of fu-
ture motivational states is crucial to maximize rewards.
The baseline model
Recently, Botvinick and collaborators (Botvinick and An,
2009; Botvinick et al., sub) proposed a Bayesian model of
goal-directed decision-making to represent the goal-directed
computations involved in solving Markov Decision Prob-
lems; see fig. 1. The model, which we use as our base-
line, takes the form of a directed graphical model (Murphy,
2002). Each node represents a discrete random variable (see
fig. 1) and each arrow represents the conditional dependence
between two random variables. State (s) variables represent
the set of world state; action (a) variables represent the set of
available actions; policy (pi) variables represent the set of ac-
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tions associated with a specific state. Finally, utility (u) vari-
ables represent the utility function corresponding to a given
state. Rather than viewing utility as a continuous variable,
the baseline model adopts an approach introduced by Cooper
(1988) in which utility is represented through the probabil-
ity of a binary variable. The following linear transformation









,rmax = max j | R(s j) | (1)
In situations involving sequential actions, this model uses
a technique proposed by Shachter and Peot (1992) which al-
lows to integrate all rewards in a single representation. This





where N is the number of u nodes. Within this model,
the utility of alternative courses of action (e.g. a navigation
episode in a labyrinth with different rewards in its branches)
can be calculated and maximized by a form of probabilis-
tic inference called reward query. In short, the probabilistic
model first assigns a desired value (i.e. a maximum value
of one) to the aggregated utility node uG. Then, it uses a
standard probabilistic inference algorithm (belief propaga-
tion, Pearl, 2000) to compute the posterior probabilities of the
policy pi nodes. Afterwards, the prior probabilities of the pol-
icy nodes are replaced by the obtained posterior probabilities,
and the inference algorithm is repeated for several trials. The
result is that the optimal policy is computed (see Botvinick
and An (2009); Botvinick et al. (sub) for more methodologi-
cal details). For instance, in a double T-Maze, which has the
highest reward in its upper right corner, the selected policy
will encode “go right twice”.
The baseline model replicates data from many animal ex-
periments, including devaluation (Balleine and Dickinson,
1998), labyrinth navigation, latent learning and detour be-
havior (Tolman, 1948), all of which are hallmarks of goal-
directed behavior. Furthermore, the baseline model explicitly
associates each net node to the corresponding brain subsys-
tem. The policy system is implemented by the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex; the action system is implemented by the
premotor cortex and the supplementary motor area. The state
system is implemented by the medial temporal cortex, the
medial frontal/parietal cortex and the caudate nucleus. Fi-
nally, the reward system is associated with the orbitofrontal
cortex and the basolateral amigdala.
Similarly to most of RL goal-directed models, the base-
line model assigns values to outcomes based on the current
motivational state of the agent. When the motivational state
changes, the utility function accordingly changes and new
utility values are assigned. In this way, the agent is not able
to anticipate the future motivational states. In next section
we show how our model diverges from the baseline model
Figure 1: The Bayesian Model of Goal-directed Decision-
making of Botvinick and An (2009).
in order to account for the ability of anticipating motivation.
Afterwards, we compare the performance of the two models
in three simulated experiments.
The model of anticipated motivation
The computational model that we propose (see fig. 2) ac-
counts for the ability of anticipating motivational states by
incorporating in the baseline model the explicit representa-
tion of the motivational system dynamics. During planning,
the baseline model assigns utility considering only the current
motivational state; rather, our extended model considers also
future motivational states. In our model the agent knows that
each future motivational state depends jointly on the previous
motivational state and on whether (and to which amount) the
agent has been satiated or not at the previous time step. In
specific, in our model of anticipated motivation, state nodes
are broken down in sub-nodes: spatial states (s), which rep-
resent the spatial position, internal states (i) which represent
the motivational state, and detection states (d), which record
the presence of potential rewards. Different motivation, such
as hunger and thirst, have separated motivational state nodes
and detection state nodes. For each motivation at a given
time-step, the spatial state influences the detection state; for
instance, if the food is in a certain (spatial) place, the agent
has to be in that place to detect it. The detection state, jointly
with the internal state, influences the internal state at the fol-
lowing time step. For example, at t1 the agent is hungry (in-
ternal state) and it is near the tree (spatial state). Once the
agent detects (detection state) and eats the food that is on the
tree, at t2 it is less hungry (following internal state).
As a consequence of the ability of anticipating motivation,
during planning our agent assigns utility considering the rela-
tionships between potential rewards and motivations. Indeed,
at each time step, utility u depends jointly on the motivational
state i and on the potential reward detected d. Each motiva-
tion has its own associated utility node u. All utility nodes at
all time steps are summed up by the global utility node (uG).
In sum, compared to the baseline model, our agent plans
considering also what we call the motivational forward
model, which describes the dynamics of the agent’s homeo-
static system (a system that monitors internal variables that
are significant for the survival of the agent itself). It cor-
responds to the transition function linking both the internal
value and the detection value at tx with the internal value at
Figure 2: The Bayesian model of anticipated motivation.
tx+1. In other words, the motivational forward model simply
translates the following scenario in mathematical terms: if at
tx I am very hungry (internal state) and I see and eat a certain
amount of food (detection state), than at tx+1 I am going to be
less hungry (proportionally to the amount of food intake).
Experiments: method and results
We simulated our model of anticipated motivation in three
simulated scenarios. In these simulations, we implemented a
particular version of the general model of anticipated motiva-
tion described above, as shown in fig. 3. We considered an
agent as characterized by two motivations: hunger and thirst.
As said in the description of the general model, each motiva-
tional system has its own internal state nodes and detection
state nodes. Thus, two internal state nodes are represented
(hunger (h) and thirst (t)) and two corresponding detection
state nodes, f ood ( f ) and water (w), respectively. At every
time-step, internal node and detection node of each motiva-
tion jointly influence the corresponding utility, as described
for the general model. Thus we have two utility nodes for
each time step: uH and uT , for hunger and for thirst respec-
tively. All utility nodes at all time steps are summed up by
the global utility node (uG).
Considering hunger as a paradigmatic example, “internal
state nodes” can assume five values: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (0 means
no hunger, 4 means maximum hunger). Similarly “detec-
tion nodes” can assume five values: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (0 means
no food detected, 4 means maximum food detected). Spa-
tial state values represent positions in a maze and can assume
5 values (corresponding to the maze positions). Action val-
ues are: ”left”, ”right” and “straight”. Policy values corre-
spond to the combination between action and state values.
The relationship between spatial states and actions (forward
model) is different in each experiment and depends on the
maze configuration (see each experiment section for details).
The relationship between spatial positions and potential re-
wards changes in every experiment and it is described by the
potential reward positions in the maze. The value of the in-
ternal state is the difference between the value of the internal
state at the previous time-step minus the value of the detection
state at the previous time-step; this accounts for the fact that
hunger lowers by eating (as the same amount as the value of
the eaten food). When the value of the internal state at the pre-
Figure 3: The model of anticipated motivation adopted in the
simulations. It includes two drives, hunger and thirst, and two
corresponding motivational forward models.
vious time-step is zero, the successive value is always raised
by 2; this represents the increased hunger associated with the
passage of time. Finally, the value of the internal state and the
value of the detection state determine jointly the conditional
probability of the utility corresponding to that motivation.
Like in the baseline model, utility is represented as the
conditional probability of the binary variable p(u/i,d). In
simulations, we represented only positive or neutral utili-
ties (being neutral utilities represented as p(u = 1/i,d) = 0
and maximum positive utilities as p(u = 1/i,d) = 1) asso-
ciated to appetitive drives. In this model, at each time step
p(u = 1/i,d) corresponds to the minor value between detec-
tion state and internal state at that time state, over the maxi-
mum absolute value of the internal state (that corresponds to
4). For example, if potential reward detected is 2 and moti-
vation is 0, than p(u = 1/i,d) = 0/4; if motivation is 1, than
p(u = 1/i,d) = 1/4; if motivation is 3 and potential reward
is 2, than p(u = 1/i,d) = 2/4.
The conditional probabilities of all nodes are deterministic,
except p(u/i,d). It means that, if the agent is in a position of
the maze and makes a certain action, it will go deterministi-
cally to another given position. Similarly, if the agent is in
a certain position and follows a given policy, it will always
make a certain action; and if the agent is in a certain position,
the potential reward in that position is always detected.
Experiment 1. Strategic planning
Humans and few other animals are able to inhibit prepotent
responses, elicited by their actual motivational state, and to
choose a course of actions that leads to higher rewards in the
future. This is obtained by considering a complex prospect of
future motivational states and corresponding future rewards
and at the same time by exerting cognitive control over pre-
potent responses (Botvinick et al., 2001).
In our first experiment, we consider the context of a T-
maze, as shown in tab. 1, left. We considered three time-
steps: at t0 the agent is in S1; at t1 it can go left to S2 or
right to S3; at t2 it goes from S2 to S4 and from S3 to S5. In
each of the five positions of the T-maze, a certain amount of
food, water or both can be found. The configuration chosen
(a) The T-maze (b) Anticipatory agent
(c) Baseline agent
Table 1: Experiment 1. Left: T-maze. Symbols represent val-
ues of detection states and internal states that are computed by
the anticipatory agent during the inference process. Potential
reward pattern (corresponding to potential reward in each po-
sition of the maze) and initial motivational states (correspond-
ing to motivational states in S2 and S3) are set by the experi-
menter, all further information is computed by reward query.
Red forms indicate motivational values that are satiated by
consumption of potential rewards in the corresponding posi-
tion of the maze. Graphically, optimal behavior corresponds
to choose the path with more red forms. Right: results of
the first experiment (top = anticipatory agent; bottom = base-
line agent). The graph represents the probability assigned to
the policy associated to “going right” (red) and “going left”
(green), respectively, at each iteration of the reward query.
in our simulation is the following: food 3 in S2, water 2 in
S3, food 3 in S4 and food 3 in S5. Then we set the initial in-
ternal states as follows: H1 = 4, T1 = 2. The critical feature
of this set-up is the presence of two policies (going left or
right) providing higher short-term and long-term cumulative
reward, respectively. We hypothesized an advantage of the
anticipatory agent in (long-term) utility maximization. In the
anticipatory agent, utility is assigned to both current and fu-
ture motivational states (related to both hunger and thirst). In
the baseline agent, utility is assigned only to rewards that are
congruent to the highest amongst actual motivational states
of the agent (i.e. hunger). Tab 1, right, shows the results of
comparison of anticipatory and baseline agents. In agreement
with our hypothesis, in the case of the anticipatory agent the
probability of choosing policy ‘going right’ increases mono-
tonically towards 1 at every iteration of the reward query. The
baseline agent has the opposite behavior, and to choses ‘go-
ing left’. Results indicate that the anticipatory agent is able
to disregard the food that can be consumed immediately (by
going left) in favor of a policy that maximizes its utility; in-
deed, by going right it satisfies both its thirst (at the second
step) and its hunger (at the third step). On the contrary, the
baseline agent, which considers only its current motivational
state, acts impulsively and selects the policy that only gives
short-term benefits.
(a) The T-maze (b) Anticipatory agent
(c) Baseline agent
Table 2: Experiment 2. Left: T-maze. Right: results.
Experiment 2. Considering the future switch of
motivation in the planning process
In a second experiment, we tested the agent’s ability to take
its future changes of motivations into account during the plan-
ning process. The T-maze in tab. 2, left, illustrates this con-
dition. Here potential rewards are: food 3 in S2 and S3; food
4 in S4; water 2 in S5. We set the initial internal states of
the agents as follows: H1 = 4; T1 = 0. A critical feature of
this set-up is that it includes distal rewards (in S4 and S5)
have different values if evaluated according to current or ex-
pected motivations. If a hungry agent (H1 = 4) predicts that
in the near future it will be satiated (i.e., it will collect food =
3), it can choose future potential rewards that at the moment
seem lower (water = 2 rather than food = 4) but that will be
higher (remind that, if at time t motivation is 0 it is raised
by 2 at time t + 1). Similar to experiment 1, we hypothe-
sized an advantage of the anticipatory agent. In agreement
with our hypothesis, results (table 2, right) indicate that the
anticipatory agent choses to go right, and is able to satisfy
both its (current) hunger and (anticipated) thirst. On the con-
trary, the baseline agent acts impulsively and prefers going
left, because it cannot take into consideration that food of S4,
when consumed, will no longer have high reward (because
the agent’s motivational state is changed).
Experiment 3. Planning for the future: storing
rewards in view of future needs
According to the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 1997), only humans, even if not motivated at the
present moment, act in a complex and flexible way to procure
rewards in view of future motivations (going, for instance,
to the supermarket even if not actually hungry). Contrary to
this idea, Raby et al. (2007) argued that even some other an-
imals such as western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica)
have this ability. In this work, experimenters thought scrub-
jays to foresee conditions in which they would have received
no food, thus feeling hungry; after this learning phase, exper-
imenters gave to the scrub-jays the possibility to cache food.
As a result, scrub-jays cached a larger amount of food when
they foresaw a future condition of deprivation compared to
(a) The T-maze (b) Anticipatory agent
(c) Baseline agent
Table 3: Experiment 3. Left: T-maze. Right: results (top =
agent with anticipated motivations; bottom = baseline model).
other conditions. These results may indicate that even west-
ern scrub-jays, at list to a certain extent, are capable to flexi-
bly account for their future motivational states (although the
results are controversial, see Roberts and Feeney, 2009).
Our third simulation is conceptually similar to the study of
Raby et al. (2007) about the agent’s ability to store rewards in
view of future motivational states (as shown in tab. 3, left).
The scenario is again a T-maze: at t0 the agent is in S1; at t1
it can go left (to S2) or right (to S3); at t2 it goes from S2 to
S4 and from S3 to S5. Once a reward is found, the agent has
two options: consuming it immediately or consuming it later,
at the following time steps. Crucially, in our model of antic-
ipated motivation, once the agent detects reward and, at the
same time, it is not motivated, it automatically stores reward
in view of future motivation. We positioned the following re-
wards: food 3 in S2 and water 1 in S3, and set the initial inter-
nal state values to H1 = 0 and T1 = 1. Since in our model the
agent can store reward if it’s not actually motivated, we hy-
pothesized that the agent would have chosen to go left, storing
food 3 in S2 (being not hungry) and consuming it in S4 (once
hungry; remind that in our model if a motivational state value
is 0 at ti it will be 2 at ti+1).
Tab. 3, right, shows the results of our experiment. In agree-
ment with our hypothesis, the anticipatory agent chooses to
go left, storing a large amount of food and eating it later,
instead of drinking immediately few water. In doing so, it
inhibits the impulsive action of consuming the immediate re-
ward (i.e., it does not choose water even if it is slightly thirsty)
in order to obtain a higher reward in the future. On the con-
trary, the baseline agent acts impulsively; it is attracted only
by the immediate reward, and is unable to plan instrumental
actions that lead to the future consumption of larger rewards.
Conclusions
In this section, we have presented a Bayesian model of goal-
directed behavior that accounts for future motivations during
planning. Our model includes a component, a motivational
forward model, for predicting future motivational states. Fur-
thermore, utility values of outcomes depend jointly on reward
amount and on motivation at the corresponding time, while
in most goal-directed RL they only depend on the former
feature. While in most RL models motivations change util-
ity function, in our model they are explicitly represented and
thus influence the value of future potential rewards. More-
over, while most RL models assigns utility only in relation to
a single motivation, usually the stronger, our model is able to
integrate dynamics of many motivational systems.
We have shown that in three simulated scenarios, namely
in the presence of a pressing impulsive need, in a future
switch of motivation and when it is possible to store food,
our model maximizes future rewards, contrary to RL models
guided only by current motivation.
The debate on how human and non-human brain represents
future motivations during planning is still controversial. Cer-
tainly, many animal species show behaviors that are prospec-
tively oriented, namely functional to their future motivation.
Migration, hibernation, nest building and food-caching are
examples of such behaviors. Nonetheless, in most cases,
these behaviors are possibly reactive. Indeed they can be in-
built Pavlovian responses triggered by conditioned or uncon-
ditioned stimuli, or reinforced instrumental responses. For
example, in Naqshbandi and Roberts (2006), squirrel mon-
keys could either eat four or just one date. Given that eat-
ing dates makes monkeys thirsty, experimenters manipulated
the delay between the meal and the availability of water. In
the one date case, water was available sooner respect to the
four dates case. While at the beginning monkeys chose four
dates, gradually they shifted their preference toward one date.
However, as they did it after a long sequence of trials, their
behavior was interpreted as reinforce-driven.
Conversely to this study, a goal-directed behavior has to
be flexible. Being goal-directed behavior based on action-
outcome contingency, it is immediately produced when it is
likely that the desired outcome will be obtained. In a recent
study, Raby et al. (2007) showed that scrub-jays cached food
only when they expected future deprivation, and did it from
the first trial. Similarly, Osvath and Osvath (2008) showed
that chimpanzees and orangutans flexibly chose a tool for fu-
ture use taking future needs into account.
Despite these studies suggest that, at least in some circum-
stances, some animals plan in view of future needs, Sudden-
dorf and Corballis (2007) still consider human planning as
unique. Indeed, they argue that the former is based on what
they call mental time travel, which consists in mentally sim-
ulating, from a subjective perspective, past and future experi-
ences in a vivid and flexible manner. This complex ability, re-
lated to episodic memory, would be the basis of planning, as it
allows to generate rich future prospects. Some no-human ani-
mals could have similar prospection abilities, which could be
implemented however using radically different neural mecha-
nisms. In a similar vein, Raby and Clayton (2009) distinguish
episodic and semantic systems of prospection; only the (more
complex) episodic system might involve self-projection in the
future.
In keeping with this view, at the neural level we hypoth-
esize a qualitative difference on how human and non-human
brains implement the motivational forward model. In keep-
ing with the ”mental time travel hypothesis”, human vivid
anticipation of future needs might partially activate brain
structures associated to those needs. For instance, even if
my homeostatic system does not currently need food in-
take, nonetheless thinking to the next Christmas lunch trig-
gers my hunger. Specifically, the human ability of anticipat-
ing motivations during planning may depend on two interre-
lated brain processes. The first may be related to more ab-
stract mechanisms of inhibiting preponderant responses and
imaging future prospects, linked to areas such as dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and cingulate cortex. The second process
may be linked to the activation of ”as-if” motivations (Dama-
sio, 1994) and hence may involve cortico-limbic structures
directly related to motivations, like amygdala, orbitofrontal
cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and anterior fusiform gyrus
(LaBar et al., 2001). The two processes may be connected as
follows: cortical anterior structures may modulate the activa-
tion of cortico-limbic structures related to simulated motiva-
tions. The ability of simulating future needs in a vivid way,
connected to the episodic memory and perhaps to the associ-
ation between prefrontal and cortico-limbic structures, might
be absent in animals. Indeed animals may be partially able to
foresee thank to rudimental frontal processes. Furthermore,
this ability might be impaired in patients with impulsivity
problems. In this case, the deficit may depend on impairment
in frontal lobe or in cortico-limbic structures. Designing ex-
periments that test these hypothesis is an important avenue
for future research.
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